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Abstract
Multi-level Governance (MLG) fundamentally challenges a state-centric, 
intergovernmentalist understanding of EU policy-making, emphasising the non-
hierarchical, interconnected and multi-actor nature of contemporary governing.  As 
such, MLG encapsulates the reconfiguration of EU policy-making space, rejecting a 
conception of governing as existing at either the domestic or international level, but 
rather as a single entity characterised by a complex web of interaction amongst the 
variety of interested actors.  The EU’s institutions are critical to the reordering of 
policy-making space in the EU in that they provide arenas of interaction.  The 
institutions undertake the role of ‘honey pot sites’, attracting actors and therefore 
facilitating the processes of interaction that so mark MLG.  By applying the analytical 
tools of new institutionalism to the experience of the city-region political 
administration of Vienna in the EU's transport infrastructure policy, this paper 
proposes a framework for understanding MLG as existing in three distinct types, 
varying in accordance to its rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalist 
guises.  In doing so, this paper offers a continuation of Hooghe and Marks’ ‘types of 
multi-level governance’ approach but in a different form.  Rather than distinguishing 
types of MLG on the basis of jurisdictional features, this paper presents three types of 
MLG emerging from differing institutional processes.2
EU Transport Infrastructure Policy, New Institutionalism and Types of Multi-
Level Governance: The Cases of Vienna and London
Introduction
The  European  integration  process  has  radically  altered  the  system  and  nature  of 
governing in Europe.  Particularly since the ‘relaunch’ of the European project with 
the 1986 Single European Act, the governing structures of the European Union (EU) 
have  been  subject  to  fundamental  change.    The  changing  nature  of  governing  in 
Europe has been accompanied by a paradigm shift in theorising within EU studies.  
Rather than theorising the EU as a process of integration, the EU came to be viewed 
as  an  existing  political  system  in  its  own  right  requiring theoretical analysis  as  a 
functioning polity.  Accompanying this ‘turn to governance’ were debates concerning 
the continuing capacity and effectiveness of the state in an era of globalisation, the 
impact  of  internal  territorial  decentralisation  and  administrative  reform,  and  the 
overall nature of the political project pursued by the state (Peters and Pierre, 2001: 
132).  Out of these debates emerged Multi-level Governance (MLG) as an attempt to 
encapsulate the multi-actor and shared authority nature of contemporary governing.
The purpose of this paper is to critically examine MLG as a theoretical framework 
through which to analyse the process of governing within the EU
1.  The first section 
provides  a  detailed  definition  of  MLG,  emphasising  its  non-hierarchical, 
interconnected and multi-actor nature.  Section two highlights the ability of MLG to 
encapsulate the reconfiguration of policy-making space as the key strength of MLG in 
its  application  to  the  EU.    This  paper  argues  that  MLG  captures  the  institution-
dependent nature of polycentric governing in the EU and as such is itself underpinned 
by an institutional focus.  In developing this argument, section three of this paper 
moves on to apply the analytical tools of new institutionalism to MLG.  In order to 
reinforce this argument, section four uses a new institutionalist understanding of MLG 
in order to analyse the results of empirical research undertaken on the experience of 
the  Vienna  city-region  political  administration  within  the  EU’s  primary  transport 
infrastructure policy - trans-European transport networks (TEN-T).  
In taking this approach, the paper attempts to take further steps in responding to the 
1         . The focus of the paper actually concerns the policy-making process in the ‘first’ European 
Community pillar of the EU’s three pillar structure.  However, in accordance with the MLG literature, 
the paper refers to the organisation as the EU.3
charge that MLG literature has paid insufficient attention to the role of institutions.  
Peters and Pierre argue that most interpretations of MLG provide a misleading image 
of governing in which institutions are largely irrelevant having been replaced by a
focus  on  context,  processes  and  bargaining  (Peters  and  Pierre,  2004:  75-76).  
Moreover, Checkel states that the little institutional analysis on offer is firmly based 
on rational choice grounds, that is, institutions as constraints (Checkel, 2001: 23).  By 
taking a new institutionalist approach to MLG this paper places institutions at the 
centre of analysing the process of the dispersal of authority.  In doing so, the paper 
presents  MLG  as  existing  in  three  different  types  in  accordance  with  the  rational 
choice, historical and sociological institutionalism perspectives.         
What is Multi-Level Governance?
MLG can be seen as a response to the state-centric, intergovernmentalist theory of the 
EU  which  dominated  EU  studies  throughout  the  so-called  ‘eurosclerosis’  period 
following the 1966 ‘Luxembourg Compromise’.  MLG challenges the view of the 
state as being the singularly important and dominating actor within the EU policy-
making  process.    Thus,  to  a  large  extent,  MLG  is  essentially  a  challenge  to  an 
understanding of the changing nature and role of the state
2.  
At the heart of the MLG framework is the claim that in an increasing number of policy 
areas no one actor has complete competence.  Marks et. al. state that ‘the point of 
departure  for  the  multi-level  governance  approach  is  the  existence  of  overlapping 
competencies  among  multiple  levels  of  government’  (Marks  et  al,  1998:  41).  
Decision-making competencies are therefore seen as being shared amongst a variety 
of actors located at different territorial levels rather than monopolised by national 
governments (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 3).  Of all actors, and perhaps unsurprisingly, 
having emerged out of particular research on the EU’s Regional Policy, MLG places a 
special  emphasis  on  the  mobilisation  of  sub-national  authorities  (SNAs)  and  their 
increasing  significance  within  the  EU  policy-making  process  (see  Marks,  1993; 
Hooghe, 1996.  See also the chapter by Pasquier in this volume).  Furthermore, MLG 
emphasises the involvement of private actors as well as public authorities (often in 
public-private networks) within governance mechanisms.  This is not to say that states 
are  no  longer  authoritative  actors,  rather  that  states  no  longer  monopolise  the 
2         . This is explicitly acknowledged in the article by Marks et al entitled, ‘European Integration 
from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.34, 
No.3 (1996).4
European policy process.  As Marks et. al. continue, ‘member state executives, while 
powerful, are only one set among a variety of actors in the European polity’ (Marks et 
al, 1998: 41).
Within this multi-actor framework, MLG rejects the notion that political arenas are 
nested.  Even though ‘national arenas remain important arenas for the formation of 
national government preferences’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 4), SNAs are seen as 
being able to pursue their interests within the European and global sphere.  Thus, the 
state is not viewed as the exclusive channel through which domestic political actors 
funnel their interests (Marks et al, 1998: 41).  Rather, arenas are interconnected with 
direct and indirect networks existing between sub-national and supranational levels, 
bypassing  the  state.    As  such,  MLG  is  non-hierarchical  whereby  the  traditional 
hierarchical command and control role of the state has been relaxed.  This has been 
accompanied  by  a  shift  in  the  nature  of  exchange  away  from  instruction  towards 
dialogue, negotiation and bargaining (Peter and Pierre, 2001: 133).  Peters and Pierre 
view  these  transformations  as  being  evidence  of  institutional  mutual  dependency 
(Peters  and  Pierre,  2004:  83)  and  a  change  in  the  zero-sum  nature  of 
intergovernmental relations (Peters and Pierre, 2001: 133).  Rather than seeing one 
institution’s  gain  as  another’s  loss,  MLG’s  emphasis  on  shared,  non-hierarchical 
competencies allows for recognition of the positive-sum, problem-solving capacity of 
contemporary governance.
The complexity that MLG attempts to depict (Rosamond, 2000: 111) has a concern for 
the mechanisms of process (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 84).  In particular, MLG stresses 
the importance of analysing the ‘day-to-day’ political processes which occur in the 
‘interstitial cracks of the EU’, in Commission and Parliamentary committees, advisory 
groups, functional councils of Ministers and so on (Jordan, 2001: 200).  In this way, 
MLG attempts to shift analytical focus away from the grand, history-making events 
that  so  preoccupy  intergovernmentalist  theory  towards  the  sub-systemic  level 
(Peterson,  1995:  69-93)  of  political  activity.    Simultaneously,  uniformity  as  an 
overriding  feature  of  governing  is  rejected  in  favour  of  an  emphasis  on  the 
heterogeneity  of  actor  involvement  in  line  with  the  nature  of  the  policy  problem.  
Diversity  in  actor  engagement  ensures  that  ‘the  structure  of  political  control  is 
variable, not constant, across policy areas’ (Marks et al, 1998: 41).  The importance of 
different political actors varies in accordance with the features of the particular policy 
problem  and  the  resources  each  actor  possesses.    Bache  and  Flinders  view  the 
distinction  between  ‘high’  and  ‘low’  political  issues,  political  processes  at  the 
implementation and post-decisional stage, and unintended consequences arising from
MLG  as  being of  particular significance  in  determining the nature of institutional 5
control (Bache and Flinders, 2004a: 199-200).
Multi-Level Governance and the European Union
MLG arrived as part of a ‘new wave’ of thinking about how to approach the study of 
the EU.  Theories of governance attempted to replace the traditional ‘supranational 
versus state’ debate concerning the European integration process with an approach 
which accepted the EU as an existing political system whose constituent parts required 
examination.  As Jordan notes, ‘the new Europeanists….arrived armed with the tools 
to investigate the various parts rather than the whole of the EU’ (Jordan, 2001: 196).  
However,  making  a  distinction  between  analysing  the  EU  either  as  a  process  of 
integration or as a political system does not seem to be as clear-cut as suggested.  
Surely  a  reciprocal  relationship  exists  between  both  forces.    In  order  to  fully 
understand the integration process, analysts must appreciate the variety of mechanisms 
and procedures at play in the policy-making process which itself guides, promotes and 
hinders the process of European integration.  At the same time, the integration process 
creates  the  conditions  within  which  policy-making  structures  are  established  and 
patterns of decision-making formed.
The strength of MLG lies in its ability to ‘widen the conceptual lens’ (Kohler-Koch 
and Rittberger, 2006: 38) within political science away from an approach based at 
either the domestic or international level towards one which is able to encapsulate the 
interaction and importance of all governmental levels within contemporary forms of 
governance.   MLG  is  said to stimulate ‘a reappraisal of the traditional dichotomy 
between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ policy’ (Bache and Flinders, 2004c: 94).  A 
‘Euromestic’  framework  allows  for  an  appreciation  of  complex  institutional 
interdependence within the EU, in which problem-solving at the EU level not only 
depends  on  domestically  located  actors  for  implementation  but  also  significantly 
impacts upon relative institutional roles and capacities within the domestic sphere.  
Simultaneously,  the  EU  policy  process  is  itself  influenced  by  the  involvement  of 
domestic actors and their interaction with supranational institutions.
As  such,  what  springs  from  MLG  is  a  concern  for  the  reconfiguration  of  policy-
making space.  Rather than the traditional process of interests and preferences being 
agreed within nested political arenas and then uploaded to the immediately superior 
level, where the process is repeated, MLG throws light on a single policy-making 
space in an increasing number of policy areas (see Scharpf, 1997) in which direct 
channels of communication and influence exist between all actors within a complex 6
web  of  interaction.    Thus,  the  assumed  institutional  trade-off within  a  ‘zero-sum’
political game is replaced by an emphasis on the necessity for shared capacities in 
order to ensure effective problem-solving.  This is not to say that the state no longer 
attempts to continue its role as gatekeeper for domestic interests and has renounced 
taking advantage of its long held relative power position, rather that it does so in a 
radically transformed political environment in which it no longer has monopolistic 
control over the levers of power.
Within  this  rearranged  policy-making  space,  MLG  is  particularly  useful  in 
incorporating the variety of political actors involved in the EU policy process within 
its theoretical framework.  As opposed to the ‘two-level game’ scenario proposed by 
intergovernmentalism  or  the  narrow  focus  on  supranational  institutions  within 
neofunctionalism, and whilst research on MLG has been accused of focusing on sub-
national authorities rather than other sub-national actors (Jordan, 2001: 201), MLG 
allows recognition of the significant role played by domestic and international interest 
groups,  business  associations,  trade  unions,  social  movements  and  sub-national 
authorities (SNAs) within the EU’s polycentric structure.  
The  increasingly  important  role  played  by  regional  government  in  EU  decision-
making  is  at  the  forefront  of  MLG’s  articulation  of  European  governance.    Sub-
national  mobilisation  via  the  establishment  of  regional  offices,  inter-regional 
associations, the Committee of the Regions and the use of Article 146 of the Treaty on 
European Union (allowing sub-national ministerial access to the Council of Ministers) 
have been exploited to ensure the interests of regional government are placed on the 
policy table.  Consequently, SNAs have become engaged in policy networks acting 
alongside institutions at all levels within the EU’s governance structure.  The state has 
been forced to accept regional authorities as actors in their own right with specific 
policy interests and goals.  To a large extent, this process has been encouraged by the 
supranational level as a result of the Commission’s need for specialist information 
from the regional level and the resultant resource-interdependent relationship that has 
come to be established between supranational and sub-national actors.
The key feature which underlines this reconfiguration of policy-making space is the 
institution-dependent  nature  of  the  MLG  form  of  policy-making  in  the  EU.  
Institutions are critical to MLG in that it is they who define and coordinate interaction 
between different levels of government (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 79).  MLG does not 
simply concern the involvement of different levels of government in policy-making.  
It  emphasises  the  continuous,  non-hierarchical  and  interconnected  relationships 
between  these  levels  of  government  in  the  process  of  policy-making.    It  is  only 7
institutions  that  can  provide  a  system  for  these  relationships  to  exist  (Peters  and 
Pierre, 2004: 80).  The institutions of the EU act as ‘honey pot sites’ around which the 
variety  of  interested  actors  cluster.    In  doing  so,  institutions  provide  an  arena  of 
interaction  in  which  non-hierarchical  and  interconnected  relationships  can  form.  
However,  within  this  arena,  the  EU’s  institutions  do  not  simply  act  as  neutral, 
mediating forces but as political players in their own right with their own interests and 
goals.  
Within this framework of multi-actor interaction, institutions act as stabilising forces.  
Whilst the involvement of actors in the process of governing in the EU is not uniform, 
the  EU  remains  a  formal  decision-making  system  in  which  there  exists  a  legally
enshrined institutional path through which policy-making progresses.  Policy-making 
in the EU does not occur on an ad hoc basis but is constrained by the established 
institutional route.  As such, institutions structure policy-making and provide stability
in a complex political environment.    
In essence, the institutions of the EU facilitate the development of informal inter-actor 
policy relationships which are the focus of MLG.  The processes which so mark MLG 
occur within the fissures of formal institutions, with the nature of informal policy
networks  being  determined  by  the  access  points  offered  by  formal  institutions 
(Pollack, 1996: 453).  In this way, MLG can be seen as an attempt to manage the 
multitude  of  policy-making  arrangements  necessary  to  confront  complex  social, 
political and economic issues through the means of institutionalisation.
The outline provided above of institutions as being central to a MLG form of policy-
making still leaves various questions to be answered, such as what precisely is meant 
by institutions and through what processes and mechanisms do institutions come to 
determine MLG.  A response to these questions is guided by the literature on new 
institutionalism and it is to this that the paper now turns in order to develop the idea of 
MLG as institution-dependent.   
New Institutionalism and Multi-level Governance
New institutionalism approaches the study of politics from the view that “institutions 
matter” because they shape political strategies and exert an independent or intervening 
influence on political outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 7).  Institutions are seen 
as the key variable in any analysis of policy-making in that they structure the input of 
social, economic and political forces and thus influence policy results (Bulmer, 1998: 8
369).    Hence,  new  institutionalism  focuses  attention  on  the  mediating  role  of  the 
institutional context in which political processes occur (Hay, 2002: 11).  In this sense, 
new institutionalism brings the ‘political’ character of politics back in to the frame as 
opposed  to  an  analysis  solely  highlighting  interaction  amongst  rational  actors 
(Kerremans, 1996: 218).  From the outset an institution-focused approach can be seen 
as  complementing  MLG  by  presenting  a  scenario  of  restricted  actor  influence  in 
policy-making.  New institutionalism’s view of political actors as being constrained 
by the institutional framework within which they operate immediately correlates itself 
with an understanding of MLG as essentially a challenge to the notion of EU policy-
making as being a process controlled by the member states
3.  
However, new institutionalism should not be seen as a coherent, unified theoretical 
perspective  but  rather  as  consisting  of  differing  variants.    Whilst  agreeing  that 
institutions are important, strands of new institutionalism contain diverse views over 
the  processes  and  mechanisms  through  which  institutions  impact  upon  political 
outcomes.  In line with the classification of Hall and Taylor, this section will utilise 
three new institutionalisms: rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism 
and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 936-957).  The remainder of 
the  paper  will  analyse  each  variant  of  new  institutionalism  in  turn,  providing  an 
overview of their main theoretical claims before applying them to MLG.
Rational Choice Institutionalism
Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) approaches the study of political outcomes with 
a certain set of assumptions concerning actor behaviour and preference formation.  
Actors are presumed to be endowed with a fixed and consistent set of preferences that 
are exogenous to the political system (March and Olsen, 1996: 250).  In order to 
achieve these given preferences actors behave in an entirely instrumental and strategic 
manner  (Hall and Taylor, 1996:  944-945).  Thus, institutions  are established (and 
survive) because they ensure the desired gains from cooperation that the rationally 
acting designers and participating actors value (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 945).  Hence, 
RCI employs a functionalist logic to institutional choice in which institutional creation 
and design is a consequence of rationally anticipated effects (Pollack, 1996: 433).   
3         . In particular, see P. Pierson, ‘The Path To European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist 
Analysis’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.29, No.2 (1996) pp.123-163 which explicitly presents 
itself as a response to intergovernmentalist analysis of the EU. 9
The  definition  of  what  constitutes  an  institution  goes  beyond  ‘hard’  formal 
organisations to also include the broad range of informal rules and procedures that 
define interests and structure conduct (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2).  Hall and Taylor 
define institutions as being ‘the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and 
conventions  embedded  in  the  organizational  structure  of  the  polity  or  political 
economy’,  be  it  a  ‘constitutional  order  or  the  standard  operating  procedures  of  a 
bureaucracy  [or]  the  conventions  governing  trade  union  behaviour  or  bank-firm 
relations’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938).   
Within  the  RCI  framework  the  role  of  institutions  is  confined  to  structuring  the 
strategic interactions amongst rational actors.  According to RCI, institutions provide 
a strategic context in which political exchange takes place, influencing outcomes by 
limiting  the  range  of  policy  choices  available  and  reducing  uncertainty  in  actor 
behaviour  (Thelen  and  Steinmo,  1992:  7;  Hall  and  Taylor,  1996:  945).    Thus, 
institutions are viewed as arenas in which self-interested actors are constrained and 
encouraged to embrace new approaches in order to realise their goals.  As Checkel 
summarises, ‘in this thin conception, institutions are a structure that actors run into, go 
‘ouch’ and then recalculate how, in the presence of the structure, to achieve their 
interests; they are an intervening variable’ (Checkel, 2001: 20).
At  first  glance,  the  RCI  approach  seems  to  be  a  natural  bedfellow  to  an 
intergovernmental  account  of  institutional  creation  within  the  EU.  
Intergovernmentalism  views  the  creation  of  institutions  in  terms  of  the  functional 
benefits they provide to member states in overcoming collective action problems.  As 
Moravcsik states, ‘the unique institutional structure of the EC is acceptable to national 
governments only insofar as it strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over 
domestic affairs’ (Moravcsik, 1993: 507).  Institutional creation is seen as an explicit 
and purposeful choice by rational, self-interest maximising actors.
However, this does not necessarily contradict MLG, for Marks also takes a member 
state actor-centred approach to the emergence of MLG in the EU (Marks, 2001: 20-
38; Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 69-80).  Hooghe and Marks accept the significant role 
of government leaders in national states in the emergence of MLG as they remain 
decisive  actors  in  determining how authority is  organised in  Europe (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2001: 77).  In explaining the reasons for the development of MLG, Marks 
begins with the question of ‘why would those in positions of authority within nation 
states  agree  to  shift  decision-making  from  central  institutions  to  sub-national  or 
supranational  institutions?’  (Marks,  2001:  23  [italics  added]).    Thus,  there  is  an 
overlap  between  the  two  theoretical  approaches  in  that  they  agree  national 10
governments  are the  initial  driving  force behind  the  establishment  of  new  policy-
making forms.  At one point Marks explicitly states that his ‘point of departure here is 
to  allow  for  the  possibility  that  those  in  government  actually  wish  to  shift 
competencies away from central states’ (Marks, 2001: 36, footnote 4).  
At its core, liberal democracy is seen as containing a distinctive characteristic in that 
maintaining authoritative leadership does not necessarily demand the centralising of 
authority.  Thus, political leaders may be willing to shift authority away from the 
central state in order to increase their bargaining leverage in international or domestic 
negotiations or to relieve themselves from the burden of responsibility for unpopular 
policy decisions (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 71-74).  Therefore, viewing MLG through 
the ‘conceptual lens’ (Allison, 1971) of RCI brings to the fore a vision of polycentric 
governance  emerging  as  a  result  of  choices  explicitly  made  by  national  political 
leaders.   
An RCI account of MLG also necessitates a focus on the notion of MLG as being a 
functionally  beneficial  form  of  policy-making.    Marks  hypothesises  that  one 
circumstance  in  which  competencies may  be  shifted  by  member  states  is  that  the 
reallocation  of  authority  is  viewed  as  having  ‘politically  salient  pareto  beneficial 
consequences’ such as ‘reduc[ing] transaction costs or increas[ing] the efficiency of 
policy provision’ (Marks, 2001: 28).  Marks and Hooghe view MLG as a normatively 
superior system of policy-making to a state based approach in that it ‘is the optimal 
way of allocating competencies in response to the trade-off between the benefits of 
scale and the costs of heterogeneity’ (Marks and Hooghe, 2000: 796).  Kohler-Koch, 
in her analysis of EU governance, sees some of these forces at work in the progressive 
uploading of policy areas to the Community.  She asserts that,
This  was  not  just  because  of  the  persuasive  capacity  of  the 
Commission….or  the  pro-integration  rulings  of  the  European  Court  of 
Justice.  Instead, it was the member states themselves that considered joint 
problem-solving  to  be  more  attractive  than  preserving  their  national 
autonomy.  As a consequence, governments may accept a further transfer of 
authority to the Community to increase, at least indirectly, their problem-
solving  capacity.    Shifting  policy  problems  from  the  national  to  the 
European  agenda  may  as  well  have  been  motivated  by  avoiding  public 
pressure or giving in to rent-seeking strategies of private actors (Kohler-
Koch, 1996: 362-363). 
Thus, MLG can be seen as emerging not only as a result of the explicit choices of 11
national leaders but, further, as a result of rational choices which explicitly had the 
creation of a joint problem-solving form of policy-making in mind.  MLG is purposely 
established  by  national  political  leaders  in  response  to  the  need  to  incorporate 
supranational and sub-national actors in the process of effectively solving complex 
socio-economic issues.  
Much  of  the  early  work  in  the  RCI  field  concerned  the  impact  of  institutional 
procedures within the US Congress on ruling certain policy alternatives ‘in’ and others 
‘out’.    Congressional  committees  were  seen  as  being  able  to  influence  policy 
outcomes  via  use  of  their  agenda-setting  power  (Pollack,  1996:  430-431).    This 
analysis  is  equally  applicable  to  MLG’s  conception  of  the  EU  as  a  result  of  its 
emphasis  on  the  importance  of  supranational  institutions,  particularly  the 
Commission.    The  Commission  formally  enjoys  the  right  of  initiative  within  EC 
‘pillar 1’ legislation and therefore is in a position to set the Community agenda by 
deciding which issues make it on to the policy table.  Beyond this, the Commission 
also enjoys substantial informal agenda-setting power through its ability to identify 
policy problems, sell policy proposals and broker compromises among the member 
states (Pollack, 1996: 449).  In this way, the procedures of Community policy-making 
can be seen to provide the Commission with a ‘nondecision-making’ (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1963: 634) influence, whereby it is able to utilise its privileged position in 
order  to  ensure  consideration  of  only  those  issues  which  do  not  undermine  its 
interests.          
Historical Institutionalism
Historical  institutionalism  (HI)  sets  out  from  an  approach  which  shares  certain 
features of RCI.  In general, both agree on the broad definition of formal and informal 
institutions as being of significance (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 28-29), whilst the 
RCI view of institutions as being arenas in which strategies are defined and interests 
pursued is also a key premise of HI (Ibid: 7).  However, HI diverges significantly on 
the matter of preference formation.  As opposed to a view of institutions as essentially 
modifying the strategies actors adopt to secure rationally pre-formed preferences, HI 
views institutions as influencing the very formation of goals.
By shaping not just actors’ strategies (as in rational choice), but their goals 
as  well,  and  by  mediating  their  relations  of  cooperation  and  conflict, 
institutions  structure  political  situations  and  leave  their  own  imprint  on 
political outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 9).  12
This  view  of  preference  formation  builds  on  Lindblom’s  earlier  view  of  the 
malleability of political preferences whereby goals are moulded by participation in a 
policy-making process.  Lindblom’s ‘disjointed incrementalism’ viewed involvement 
in a policy system as an educating force in which actors learn how to formulate policy 
positions,  learn  what  policy  positions  are  feasible  and  learn  how  to  tailor  policy 
positions in order to increase their chances of success (Lindblom, 1968: 102).  In this 
sense, preferences are endogenous to the political system, formed through processes of 
interaction with other actors and the formal and informal institutions themselves. The 
perception  of  rational  action  results  from  the  subjective  evaluation  of  policy 
alternatives and consequences within a given institutional context (March and Olsen, 
1996:  250).    Thus,  inherent  within  the  HI  account  is  a  focus  on  the  reciprocal 
relationship between the policy-making system and actor preferences in which the 
system affects the very preferences to which it also responds (Lindblom, 1968: 101).  
HI also questions the RCI approach over its functional understanding of institutional 
creation  for  it  is  incapable  of  explaining  the  existence  of  inefficient  institutions 
(Pollack, 1996: 434).  What emerges from this critique is an emphasis on unintended 
consequences and path dependence as fundamental features of institutional analysis.  
HI  sees  a  ‘thickening’  of  institutions  over  time.    For  Pierson  (1996:  129-136), 
institutions are originally established in line with the RCI conception; as a result of the 
presumed gains they will contribute to actors’ desired goals.  However, gaps in agent 
control occur over time leading to unanticipated consequences as a result of short 
termism and the complexities of poorly understood social processes.  Thus, political 
outcomes are ‘path dependent’ whereby institutions take on a dynamic of their own, 
constraining policy choices by locking in certain policy paths which do not necessarily 
coincide with actors’ preferences.  In this way, institutions can become difficult to 
reform.  Rather than shifting in accordance with changing preferences, institutions are 
‘sticky’, reflecting past choices as opposed to current social and economic conditions 
(Pollack, 1996: 438).  HI therefore problematises the controlling power of actors over 
institutions  and  the  very  rationality  of  institutions  assumed  by  RCI,  preferring  to 
emphasise the independent nature that institutions adopt over time resulting from early 
institutional choices.
The third  dominant  feature of HI concerns the role of power, particularly relative 
power, both in terms of institutional creation and distribution.  Whilst RCI can be 
criticised for ignoring relative power relations by painting a picture of voluntary quasi-
contractual agreement (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 952), HI not only views institutions as 
structuring  power  relations  between  actors,  but  more  importantly,  as  distributing 13
power unevenly between those actors.  The institutional organisation of policy-making 
is seen as providing certain actors disproportionate access to decision-making, leading 
to the creation of winners and losers in policy outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 941).  
According to Thelen and Steinmo, this mobilisation of bias is well-understood by 
political  actors  which  creates  the  accompanying  necessity  to  analyse  the  role  of 
relative power in institutional creation (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 9-10).
The  application  of  a  HI  analytical  framework  to  MLG  paints  a  picture  of  the 
emergence  of  MLG  over  time  as  a  result  of  the  EU’s  structural  organisation, 
procedures and norms.  Initial member state choices concerning institutional design 
and policies lead to a dispersal of authority to supranational and sub-national arenas 
not initially envisaged.  MLG emerges through a process of path dependency in which 
initial policy choices structure and restrict subsequent developments.  As Hooghe and 
Marks state, ‘multi-level governance, like state building, is largely a by-product.  It is 
the  outcome  of  political  pressures  that,  in  most  cases,  do  not  have  multi-level 
governance as their objective’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 75). 
Autonomous supranational institution action is a case in point.  Member states seem 
to be in a ‘catch 22’ situation when it comes to the creation of supranational agents.  
Principal-agent literature guides our understanding of this dilemma.  In order to ensure 
the desired gains from cooperation are fulfilled, principals (such as the member states) 
create  new  institutions  (such  as  the  Commission)  to  carry  out  certain  functions.  
However, the necessity for effective decision-making and enforcement requires the 
supranational agent to be endowed with sufficient resources and authority to undertake 
its tasks.  Thus, the agent is provided with the ability to pursue its own preferences 
which may not coincide with those of the principals (Pierson, 1996: 132).  As Moe 
argues, this is a well-observed process
A new public agency is literally a new actor on the political scene.  It has its 
own interests, which may diverge from those of its creators, and it typically 
has resources – expertise, delegated authority – to strike out on its own 
should the opportunity arise (Moe, 1990: 121).
Marks  and  Hooghe  allude  to  this  process  of  agent activism  by  asserting that  one 
reason  why  MLG  may  arise  is  through  government  leaders  losing  control  of  the 
activities  of  the  supranational  and  sub-national  organisations  they  have  set  up 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 75-77). 
The Commission’s privileged position as a centre of information, its budgetary and 14
intellectual resources and its formal agenda-setting power are of significance here as it 
is through these mechanisms that the Commission is able to pursue its interests.  A 
similar process of agent activism can be identified in the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ).    Through  its  legal  rulings,  particularly  those  establishing  the  principles  of 
supremacy,  direct  effect  and  mutual  recognition,  the  ECJ  has  laid  the  legal 
foundations for an integrated European economy and polity (Burley and Mattli, 1993: 
42).  The extent of judicial activism has been such that it leads Volcansek to label the 
ECJ ‘the principal motor for the integration of Europe’ (Volcansek, 1992: 109).
A second result of initial choices is the materialisation of unintended consequences 
which encourage the emergence of MLG.  Pierson (1996: 135-139) emphasises the 
long-run, unanticipated implications of decisions that are taken by political leaders for 
short-term, usually electoral, gains.  Moreover, he claims that even if policy-makers 
do focus on long-run effects, unanticipated consequences remain likely due to the 
complexities of social processes.  This is particularly seen as the case in the EU due to 
the presence of high issue density, which in turn generates problems of overload and 
spillover.
Hooghe and Marks (2001: 77-78) see these unanticipated consequences in practice 
through  the  mobilisation  of  sub-national  actors  as  a  response  to  the  uploading  of 
policy  competence from the national to the European level.  European integration 
encourages sub-national actors to shift their focus to the EU level in order to secure a 
voice in the new policy-making arena.  This occurs through such developments as the 
establishment  of  sub-national  offices  in  Brussels,  direct  communication  with  the 
Commission, the creation of pan-EU transregional associations and campaigning for 
direct  representation  in  the  Council  of  Ministers.    Thus,  the  decision  to  deepen 
integration may instigate a ‘domino effect’ of unforeseen activity as a result of the 
transformation of the political environment in which actors operate, culminating in the 
emergence of MLG. 
Analysing MLG with the analytical tools of HI also sheds light on the difficulties of 
modifying  the  institutional  procedures  and  forms  that  constitute  MLG  once  in 
existence.    The  EU  contains  clear  institutional  barriers  to  reform.    Of  particular 
importance is Scharpf’s ‘joint-decision trap’ (Scharpf, 1988: 239-278).  The obstacles 
presented by the requirement for unanimity or qualified majority voting in order to 
overturn previous decisions means that MLG becomes ‘locked-in’ as a feature of EU 
policy-making.
The constraints posed by institutional arrangements ‘from above’ are compounded by 15
the sunk costs resulting from societal level adaptation to MLG.  Pierson highlights a 
second account of ‘lock-in’,
When  actors  adapt  to  the  new  rules  of  the  game  by  making  extensive 
commitments  based  on  the  expectation  that  these  rules  will  continue, 
previous decisions may lock in member states to policy options that they 
would not now choose to initiate.  Put another way, social adaptation to EC 
institutions and policies drastically increases the cost of exit from existing 
arrangements for member states (Pierson, 1996: 144-145).
Thus,  societal actors gain a vested interest in  MLG and the costs associated with 
disrupting  the  situation  act  as  a  further  barrier  to  change.
4    Consequently,  MLG 
becomes  ‘sticky’,  reflecting  past  choices  as  opposed  to  the  current preferences  of 
political leaders.             
Sociological Institutionalism
At the heart of sociological institutionalism (SI) is a concern for the socio-cultural 
structures in which action occurs.  SI broadens the definition of institutions further 
than RCI and HI to include symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that 
provide meaning to action (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 947).  By doing so, institutions are 
viewed as constituting actors and their interests in the sense that they provide actors 
with identities, conceptions of reality, standards of assessment and behavioural rules 
(March and Olsen, 1996: 249).  Institutions are seen as constructing a reality in which 
choices are made.  As Hall and Taylor state, ‘institutions  influence behaviour not 
simply by specifying what one should do but also by specifying what one can imagine 
oneself  doing in  a given context’  (Hall and Taylor, 1996:  948).   In this  sense SI 
essentially questions the given rationality of the RCI approach, claiming that what 
actors  view  as  rational  action  is  itself  constructed  according  to  the  socio-cultural 
context in which actors exist.
What follows from this perspective is an interpretation of organisational forms and 
practices as being culturally embedded, reflecting culturally specific practices rather 
4                 .  Marks  recognises  institutional  lock-in and  sunk  costs  in  his actor-centred  approach  as 
constraints on the ability of government leaders to reverse the dispersal of authority, G. Marks, ‘An 
Actor-Centred Approach to Multi-Level Governance’, in C. Jeffery, ed., The Regional Dimension of the 
European Union (London: Frank Cass, 2001) pp.32-34.16
than functional efficiency (Hall and Talyor, 1996: 946).  Thus, institutional design and 
actor behaviour are said to follow the ‘logic of appropriateness’ whereby choices are 
made according to what is viewed as socially valuable or suitable rather than a rational 
‘logic of consequence’ (March and Olsen, 1996: 252; Hall and Taylor, 1996: 949).
The application of SI to MLG indicates a process in which participating in EU policy-
making provides actors with conceptions of their own identities and of how to act.  
MLG can be seen to emerge as a result of actor behaviour that is ‘learnt’ from being 
identified as a particular actor in  the EU.  Bulmer is correct in asserting that the 
institutions of the EU are not value free, but contain embedded values and norms 
which  impact  on  how  their  functions  are  operationalised  (Bulmer,  1998:  368).  
However, it is the identification of an institution as being, for example, supranational 
(via the provision of particular competencies) that provides it with a certain ethos and 
behaviour.  Thus, the behaviour of the Commission and ECJ is influenced by their 
self-perceived roles as supranational institutions which encourages them to support 
further integration and an expansionary interpretation of the treaties (Bulmer, 1994: 
363).  This enthusiasm comes precisely from a norm of integration which is embedded
within the cultures of these institutions.  It is plausible that a similar process relates to 
sub-national  actors  whereby  their  self-perception  as  distinct  actors  with  their  own 
interests  encourages  demands  for  greater  devolution  of  policy  competencies  and 
involvement in EU decision-making.  
Therefore, actors can be seen to behave in a manner they perceive as being socially 
appropriate in accordance with their roles, leading to the dispersal of authority away 
from the central state.  In this way, MLG does not only emerge, but also becomes self-
reinforcing whereby actors learn to  function according  to  the behavioural rules of 
MLG.  If it is assumed that social learning is more likely where actors meet repeatedly 
and there is a high density of interaction (Checkel, 2001: 26), MLG itself becomes 
embedded as a form of policy-making.
What  emerges  from  this  exercise  of  applying  the  analytical  tools  of  new 
institutionalism  to  MLG  is  a conception of MLG as existing in different types as 
opposed to the singular version traditionally conceived.  The three conceptual lenses 
of new institutionalism offering differing accounts of the emergence and existence of 
MLG.  In order to reinforce this argument, the paper uses this new institutionalist 
understanding of MLG in order to analyse the results of empirical research undertaken 
on the experience of the city-region political administration of Vienna within the EU’s 
trans-European transport networks (TEN-T) policy area   17
Types of Multi-Level Governance and TEN-T Policy: Vienna
The rationale for studying TEN-T policy is the well-documented relationship between 
transport infrastructure and regional economic development (see Hart, 1993; 
Vickerman, 1994; Fayman & Metge, 1995; Johnson & Turner, 1997; Vickerman et al, 
1999; Peters, 2003; Stevens, 2004).  It is precisely this relationship which underpins 
the enduring link between the EU’s regional and transport infrastructure policy areas.  
Infrastructure, and particularly transport infrastructure, has always had a prominent 
place within the EU’s regional policy, accounting for 75% of ERDF expenditure from 
1975-89 and an estimated 29% of Structural Funds expenditure in Objective 1 regions 
1989-93 (Vickerman, 1995: 238).  Thus, there exists a clear regional interest in 
transport infrastructure leading to the potential mobilisation of sub-national political 
and economic resources within TEN-T policy.  However, at the same time, the process 
of TEN-T policy-making remains a highly under-researched area.  
The RCI view of MLG emerging as a result of explicit choices by national political 
leaders to shift authority away from the central state in order to ensure desired gains 
can account for the eagerness of the Austrian federal government to involve the 
Vienna city administration in TEN-T policy, despite policy competence 
constitutionally existing exclusively at the federal level.  The most prominent of these 
desired gains is the necessity for effective policy outcomes.  The fact that Vienna is 
involved in five out the six TEN-T Priority Projects that affect Austria means that the 
specialised local knowledge and expertise of the Vienna city administration is 
required by the federal government.  As one official at the Federal Ministry for 
Transport, Innovation and Technology said, ‘although formally the federal 
government is competent, the laender have a high influence.  The government depends 
on the laender because it wants to succeed in the policy.’  Another official at the 
ministry stated, ‘you would not be advised to decide something without involving the 
land concerned because if you do then you will have a lot of problems.’  Furthermore, 
it is not only the benefits of an enhanced problem-solving capacity which the federal 
government seeks from transferring authority.  There are also the potential electoral 
advantages emanating from the efficient construction of politically popular transport 
networks.  As the first official continued, ’the government also depends on the laender 
to perhaps get more votes at the next election.  So it needs the laender from a political 
point of view.’
HI’s interpretation of MLG as emerging as a result of a process of path dependence 
can also be seen in the case of Vienna.  Cooperative federalism is firmly ’locked-in’ as 18
a feature of Austrian politics in which levels of government interact and are closely 
linked (Ferrara, 2005: 109).  Thus, it represented a pre-existing pattern of inter-
governmental relations within the Austrian state which were naturally applied to 
laender involvement in TEN-T policy-making.  As an official at the Transport 
Ministry confirmed, ‘there must be some communication (between the federal 
government and the laender) because whenever the interests of the laender are affected 
there must be a consultation.  Even any small project must be agreed with the 
corresponding land.’  As such, a clear channel of involvement with, and influence 
over, the federal government existed for the Vienna city administration with respect to 
the TEN-T projects that involved Vienna.  The channels of communication utilised 
were not only the formal joint national-regional body established to coordinate 
federal-laender European interests, the Council for EU Integration Policy (Rat fur 
Fragen der Europaischen Integrationspolitik).  In fact, the Council is seen as being of 
limited use due to the difficulties in coordinating the differing interests of the different 
laender.  Rather, direct contact with the Transport Ministry was, and continues to be, 
preferred.  Personal links between the Vienna city administration and the federal 
government further serve to encourage direct channels of communication, such as the 
fact that the Minister for Transport was previously a city councillor in Vienna.  
Something which Vienna attempts to use to its advantage.  As an official within 
Vienna’s Municipal Department 18 (Urban Development and Planning) put it, ’we 
can remind him of those links.’
SI’s understanding of MLG emerging as a result of a ’learnt’ process whereby actors 
behave  in  accordance  with  their  socially  perceived  roles  accounts  for  the  active 
mobilisation of Vienna city administration’s political and economic resources within 
the TEN-T policy area.  The Vienna city administration perceives itself as being a 
distinct  political  actor  with  its  own  European  interests.    The  removal  of  the  Iron 
Curtain and recent EU enlargement in central and eastern Europe has led to Vienna 
identifying itself as a city at the heart of the ‘new Europe‘.  The city administration 
was at the forefront of this process.  Mayor Michael Haupl instigated a process of 
administrative and cultural reform on Austria‘s accession to the EU in 1995 in order 
to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the new geopolitical environment 
Vienna found itself in.  A process which has ‘permanently changed the self-image 
within the bureaucracy’ (Theimer, 2004: 6).  Key amongst these was encouraging the 
various municipal departments to identify with European activity within their policy 
portfolios under the slogan ’Think European.  Act Locally.’  
In terms of transport infrastructure policy, the Vienna city administration identified 
itself as being a ‘gateway to the east‘ for western Europe and a ‘transport bridge’19
between  east  and  west.    As  such,  Vienna’s  primary  TEN-T  interest  has  been  to 
position itself as an interface in the European transport network and as a key TEN-T 
node  (Schwetz,  2004:  96).    As  the  same  official  within  Vienna’s  Municipal 
Department 18 stated, ‘we prefer our role as a land (rather than a city) because nobody 
would  expect  a  city  to  discuss  such  questions  because  everybody  says  that  cities 
should organise there public transport within the city.‘  Thus, there is a clear attempt 
to identify itself as a political entity beyond simply being a city and link Vienna to 
wider Europe rather than focus on strictly internal public transport issues.  It was this 
self-perception which led to the Vienna city administration mobilising its resources to 
strive  for  its  goals  within  TEN-T  policy.    At  the  European  level,  this  has  been 
undertaken via direct contact with the European Commission and Parliament, strong 
involvement in the Committee of the Regions, lobbying via Vienna’s Representative 
Office in Brussels, and engagement with pan-EU transregional associations such as 
Eurocities.
Conclusion
This  paper  has  presented  MLG  as  fundamentally  a  challenge  to  a  state  based 
understanding of policy-making in the EU.  MLG captures the multi-located nature of 
contemporary  governing  in  the  EU.    MLG  rejects  the  conception  of  conceiving 
governing  processes  as  existing  at  either  the  domestic  or  international  level, 
emphasising  an  overlapping,  interconnected,  non-hierarchical  and  multi-actor 
framework of interdependence.  As such, the strength of MLG lies in its ability to 
encapsulate  the  reconfiguration  of  policy-making  space  away  from  interaction 
between nested political arenas towards a singular entity characterised by a complex 
web  of  interaction  amongst  the  variety  of  actors  involved  in  EU  governance.  
Underpinning the reordering of policy-making space is the key role played by the 
EU’s institutions in the process of EU policy-making.  Institutions are central to MLG 
in that they provide arenas in which interested actors gather, therefore facilitating the 
processes that so mark MLG.
In order to develop the idea of MLG being institution dependent, the paper examined 
MLG using the analytical tools provided by new institutionalism.  What materialises 
from this exercise is a conception of MLG as emerging and existing in different types 
as opposed to the singular version of MLG traditionally conceived.  In a sense, this is 
a continuation of Hooghe and Marks’ ‘types of multi-level governance’ (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2003: 233-243) approach but in a different form.  Rather than distinguishing 
types of MLG on the basis of jurisdictional features, this paper presents three types of 20
MLG emerging from differing institutional processes.  The three conceptual lenses of 
new institutionalism offer differing accounts of MLG.  
Rational choice institutionalism paints a picture of MLG emerging as a result of the 
explicit choices of national political leaders as the shifting of authority ensures desired 
gains, be it the acquisition of bargaining advantages, the divesting of responsibility or 
as  a  means  of  ensuring  effective  problem-solving.    On  the  other  hand,  historical 
institutionalism  views  MLG  as  resulting  from  a  path  dependent  process  of  initial 
choices  leading  to  autonomous  supranational  institution  action  and  unanticipated 
consequences  which  disperses  authority  away  from  the  central  state.    MLG  then 
becomes ‘locked-in’ due to the procedural difficulties in the EU of reforming past 
decisions and a process of societal adaptation.  A sociological institutionalist approach 
meanwhile  emphasises  MLG  as  a  ‘learnt’  process  whereby  actors  behave  in 
accordance with their socially perceived roles.  An analysis of the experience of the 
Vienna  city  administration  in  the  TEN-T  policy  area  shows  all  three  of  these 
institutional processes at work in the dispersal of authority away from the Austrian 
state.
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